In progress - Scheduled maintenance is currently in progress. We will provide updates as necessary.
Nov 06, 2026 - 14:00 UTC
Nov 06, 2026 - 14:00 UTC
Scheduled - The Canton network is applying a topology freeze on Mainnet in preparation for the Logical Synchronizer Upgrade (LSU). This is a network-wide event coordinated by the Canton Foundation, not Blockdaemon maintenance.
Window: November 06, 2026, 14:00 UTC to November 07, 2026, 14:00 UTC (until after the LSU completes; may extend slightly)
Impact:
Transactions continue to work normally.
Topology-changing operations will not succeed during the window, including new contract deployments, validator onboarding, and DAR uploads.
Action required: None. Customers should schedule any topology-changing operations outside this window. We'll update this notice when the freeze is lifted.
If you have any questions or concerns please reach out to your account managers.
Nov 6, 2026 14:00 - Nov 7, 2026 14:00 UTC
Window: November 06, 2026, 14:00 UTC to November 07, 2026, 14:00 UTC (until after the LSU completes; may extend slightly)
Impact:
Transactions continue to work normally.
Topology-changing operations will not succeed during the window, including new contract deployments, validator onboarding, and DAR uploads.
Action required: None. Customers should schedule any topology-changing operations outside this window. We'll update this notice when the freeze is lifted.
If you have any questions or concerns please reach out to your account managers.
Nov 6, 2026 14:00 - Nov 7, 2026 14:00 UTC
Update - Our investigation, conducted alongside two independent incident response firms, Foresite and Mandiant, has now confirmed the full scope of this incident and how it occurred. Here is where things stand.
The incident is contained. The compromised keys have no remaining access to any Blockdaemon-controlled asset: the five affected vote accounts and their identity accounts have been permanently retired, replacement validators are live, and the withdraw authorities on every other Blockdaemon Solana mainnet validator have been rotated.
No other product, service or protocol has been impacted by this incident.
Scope of impact
Between 2026-10-26 19:03 UTC and 2026-10-27, an unauthorised party used private keys associated with five Blockdaemon-operated Solana mainnet validators (four live, one retired) and one internal Blockdaemon operational wallet.
No delegated stake affected or at risk at any point. Delegated SOL stays in each delegator’s own stake account, under authorities held only by the delegator. Blockdaemon did not hold those authorities, and no customer-held key was involved in any transaction.
All other Blockdaemon-operated Solana mainnet and testnet validators have been verified as unaffected.
A full code review of our staking API, transaction verification service and staking web application found no unexplained changes.
The withdraw authority on the five vote accounts was subsequently reassigned by the unauthorised party. Under Solana’s authority model this cannot be reversed, so those vote accounts have been permanently retired. They ceased earning rewards from epoch 1068 and were made delinquent from epoch 1070.
How it happened
Our investigation has identified that a copy of the compromised key material was held on a corporate device assigned to a former employee and was copied from that device to systems outside Blockdaemon’s control during that individual’s off-boarding in December 2025. The unauthorised copy was not detected at the time. Since then, Blockdaemon has enhanced its data loss prevention and endpoint protection controls and is applying further improvements based on lessons learned from this incident.
The affected keys were generated between 2020 and 2022. Validators created in 2024 or later use a different, unaffected key generation process
The identity of the unauthorised party has not been determined A report has been filed with the applicable government authorities.
Actions taken:
Four replacement validators deployed, keyed, funded and synchronised by 2026-10-27 22:28 UTC, with new credentials held in a new access-restricted vault.
Blockdaemon’s public vote account address rotated across the web UI and all active staking plans; staking configurations for the compromised vote accounts disabled to prevent new delegations.
Affected customers notified directly, and redelegation instructions published.
Original validator hosts were preserved as evidence and examined with no indicators of compromise confirmed.
Compromised addresses shared with the Solana Foundation.
Taken out of an abundance of caution:
Withdraw authorities rotated on all four non-impacted mainnet validators.
Revenue share paused on rotated and replacement validators pending security sign-off.
A full-year audit review of our secrets management platform, an access log review of our credential vaults, and a 12-month endpoint search across all managed devices. No evidence of compromise was found in any of these.
Low-balance alerting on vote accounts reviewed and re-verified in production.
What you need to do
Nothing has changed since our earlier guidance. If you delegated to an affected validator, please move your stake to our replacement validator. Use only the address published on this page or sent to you directly by Blockdaemon, as look-alike addresses are circulating.
If you did not receive a notification from us, you were not affected.
What's next
Affected customers will receive our formal Root Cause Analysis.
For the full update, see: https://www.blockdaemon.com/incident-reports/operational-impact-on-solana-validators
Questions: support@blockdaemon.com
Nov 06, 2026 - 10:32 UTC
The incident is contained. The compromised keys have no remaining access to any Blockdaemon-controlled asset: the five affected vote accounts and their identity accounts have been permanently retired, replacement validators are live, and the withdraw authorities on every other Blockdaemon Solana mainnet validator have been rotated.
No other product, service or protocol has been impacted by this incident.
Scope of impact
Between 2026-10-26 19:03 UTC and 2026-10-27, an unauthorised party used private keys associated with five Blockdaemon-operated Solana mainnet validators (four live, one retired) and one internal Blockdaemon operational wallet.
No delegated stake affected or at risk at any point. Delegated SOL stays in each delegator’s own stake account, under authorities held only by the delegator. Blockdaemon did not hold those authorities, and no customer-held key was involved in any transaction.
All other Blockdaemon-operated Solana mainnet and testnet validators have been verified as unaffected.
A full code review of our staking API, transaction verification service and staking web application found no unexplained changes.
The withdraw authority on the five vote accounts was subsequently reassigned by the unauthorised party. Under Solana’s authority model this cannot be reversed, so those vote accounts have been permanently retired. They ceased earning rewards from epoch 1068 and were made delinquent from epoch 1070.
How it happened
Our investigation has identified that a copy of the compromised key material was held on a corporate device assigned to a former employee and was copied from that device to systems outside Blockdaemon’s control during that individual’s off-boarding in December 2025. The unauthorised copy was not detected at the time. Since then, Blockdaemon has enhanced its data loss prevention and endpoint protection controls and is applying further improvements based on lessons learned from this incident.
The affected keys were generated between 2020 and 2022. Validators created in 2024 or later use a different, unaffected key generation process
The identity of the unauthorised party has not been determined A report has been filed with the applicable government authorities.
Actions taken:
Four replacement validators deployed, keyed, funded and synchronised by 2026-10-27 22:28 UTC, with new credentials held in a new access-restricted vault.
Blockdaemon’s public vote account address rotated across the web UI and all active staking plans; staking configurations for the compromised vote accounts disabled to prevent new delegations.
Affected customers notified directly, and redelegation instructions published.
Original validator hosts were preserved as evidence and examined with no indicators of compromise confirmed.
Compromised addresses shared with the Solana Foundation.
Taken out of an abundance of caution:
Withdraw authorities rotated on all four non-impacted mainnet validators.
Revenue share paused on rotated and replacement validators pending security sign-off.
A full-year audit review of our secrets management platform, an access log review of our credential vaults, and a 12-month endpoint search across all managed devices. No evidence of compromise was found in any of these.
Low-balance alerting on vote accounts reviewed and re-verified in production.
What you need to do
Nothing has changed since our earlier guidance. If you delegated to an affected validator, please move your stake to our replacement validator. Use only the address published on this page or sent to you directly by Blockdaemon, as look-alike addresses are circulating.
If you did not receive a notification from us, you were not affected.
What's next
Affected customers will receive our formal Root Cause Analysis.
For the full update, see: https://www.blockdaemon.com/incident-reports/operational-impact-on-solana-validators
Questions: support@blockdaemon.com
Nov 06, 2026 - 10:32 UTC
Monitoring - Following our previous notices regarding the October 26–27 validator incident, we are providing the latest findings from our ongoing investigation, conducted alongside two independent external incident response firms.
The forensic scope evaluated full disk and log collections from the affected validator hosts, a full year of secrets-management audit logs, password vault access records, and endpoint telemetry. This analysis confirmed no intrusion, exfiltration, or persistence on our validator hosts. Furthermore, the review identified no unauthorized access to the affected keys within our secrets-management systems, and no access to or export of the keys from our password vaults between October 2025 and the date of the incident.
The investigation has established the origin of the exposure. The affected validator credentials were all generated between 2020 and 2022. Forensic analysis determined that the key material originated from a local copy on a corporate device assigned to a former employee. Endpoint telemetry confirms that an unauthorized transfer of data took place from the device to personal systems, which our analysis indicates contained the legacy key material.
Relevant on-chain indicators have been shared directly with the Solana Foundation, and all impacted customers have been notified and engaged. We will issue a formal, comprehensive Root Cause Analysis (RCA) report as soon as the investigation formally concludes.
Full details and live updates are published here: https://www.blockdaemon.com/incident-reports/operational-impact-on-solana-validators
Nov 01, 2026 - 18:54 UTC
The forensic scope evaluated full disk and log collections from the affected validator hosts, a full year of secrets-management audit logs, password vault access records, and endpoint telemetry. This analysis confirmed no intrusion, exfiltration, or persistence on our validator hosts. Furthermore, the review identified no unauthorized access to the affected keys within our secrets-management systems, and no access to or export of the keys from our password vaults between October 2025 and the date of the incident.
The investigation has established the origin of the exposure. The affected validator credentials were all generated between 2020 and 2022. Forensic analysis determined that the key material originated from a local copy on a corporate device assigned to a former employee. Endpoint telemetry confirms that an unauthorized transfer of data took place from the device to personal systems, which our analysis indicates contained the legacy key material.
Relevant on-chain indicators have been shared directly with the Solana Foundation, and all impacted customers have been notified and engaged. We will issue a formal, comprehensive Root Cause Analysis (RCA) report as soon as the investigation formally concludes.
Full details and live updates are published here: https://www.blockdaemon.com/incident-reports/operational-impact-on-solana-validators
Nov 01, 2026 - 18:54 UTC
Update - Update as of 10/29/2026
Our investigation into the recent validator event remains ongoing in close coordination with independent external forensic specialists. While a final root cause has not yet been formally concluded, findings to date point directly to a historical key generation practice that was discontinued and no longer exists in our environment. This historical practice was strictly limited in scope.
Importantly, external forensic findings to date confirm that our present infrastructure, controls, and active environments have not been breached, and no current systems were accessed during this event.
The containment of this incident reflects our underlying architecture. Our Software Development Lifecycle enforces protocol isolation by design, accounting for the unique technical requirements and operational mechanics of each network. This model includes segregated delivery teams, isolated source code, and most critically, separate and independent key management for each protocol.
We will continue to provide updates and will publish verified findings as soon as the investigation formally concludes. If you have any questions, our support channels remain available.
Full details, FAQ and live updates: https://www.blockdaemon.com/incident-reports/operational-impact-on-solana-validators
Oct 30, 2026 - 00:04 UTC
Our investigation into the recent validator event remains ongoing in close coordination with independent external forensic specialists. While a final root cause has not yet been formally concluded, findings to date point directly to a historical key generation practice that was discontinued and no longer exists in our environment. This historical practice was strictly limited in scope.
Importantly, external forensic findings to date confirm that our present infrastructure, controls, and active environments have not been breached, and no current systems were accessed during this event.
The containment of this incident reflects our underlying architecture. Our Software Development Lifecycle enforces protocol isolation by design, accounting for the unique technical requirements and operational mechanics of each network. This model includes segregated delivery teams, isolated source code, and most critically, separate and independent key management for each protocol.
We will continue to provide updates and will publish verified findings as soon as the investigation formally concludes. If you have any questions, our support channels remain available.
Full details, FAQ and live updates: https://www.blockdaemon.com/incident-reports/operational-impact-on-solana-validators
Oct 30, 2026 - 00:04 UTC
Update - Following our October 27 notice about exposed operator keys on a small subset of our validators, here is an update on our security review.
Working with external digital forensics partners, we have found no indicators of compromise across our broader infrastructure, and no indication that any other Blockdaemon products, services, protocols or validators are affected. Customer data and assets remain uncompromised, and no client data or sensitive information was accessed.
As previously noted, delegated SOL remains safe in delegators’ own stake accounts.
The incident is limited to the operational accounts identified in our initial notice. All impacted customers have been notified, so if you did not receive a notification, you were not impacted. If you believe you were, contact support@blockdaemon.com.
Beyond the deactivation and re-delegation steps already recommended, no further client action is required. We are maintaining active monitoring across our infrastructure. For help re-delegating stake or other questions, contact Blockdaemon support or see our FAQ.
Validator address: The new validator’s vote account is 9ntyW2ufs5hGECKLwhR4p7PuQhqAbfKdAwNoYbgXsExn (https://solscan.io/account/9ntyW2ufs5hGECKLwhR4p7PuQhqAbfKdAwNoYbgXsExn).
Look-alike addresses are circulating on-chain, so only use the address published on our incident page or sent to you directly by Blockdaemon. Never copy a validator address from your transaction history, and verify the full address, not just the first and last few characters, before signing.
Full details, FAQ and live updates: https://www.blockdaemon.com/incident-reports/operational-impact-on-solana-validators
Oct 28, 2026 - 21:13 UTC
Working with external digital forensics partners, we have found no indicators of compromise across our broader infrastructure, and no indication that any other Blockdaemon products, services, protocols or validators are affected. Customer data and assets remain uncompromised, and no client data or sensitive information was accessed.
As previously noted, delegated SOL remains safe in delegators’ own stake accounts.
The incident is limited to the operational accounts identified in our initial notice. All impacted customers have been notified, so if you did not receive a notification, you were not impacted. If you believe you were, contact support@blockdaemon.com.
Beyond the deactivation and re-delegation steps already recommended, no further client action is required. We are maintaining active monitoring across our infrastructure. For help re-delegating stake or other questions, contact Blockdaemon support or see our FAQ.
Validator address: The new validator’s vote account is 9ntyW2ufs5hGECKLwhR4p7PuQhqAbfKdAwNoYbgXsExn (https://solscan.io/account/9ntyW2ufs5hGECKLwhR4p7PuQhqAbfKdAwNoYbgXsExn).
Look-alike addresses are circulating on-chain, so only use the address published on our incident page or sent to you directly by Blockdaemon. Never copy a validator address from your transaction history, and verify the full address, not just the first and last few characters, before signing.
Full details, FAQ and live updates: https://www.blockdaemon.com/incident-reports/operational-impact-on-solana-validators
Oct 28, 2026 - 21:13 UTC
Identified - Between 26 and 27 October, Blockdaemon identified that operator keys for a small set of our oldest running Solana validators were compromised. The attacker was able to change the withdrawal authority on the impacted validators and move a limited amount of operational assets from their operational accounts.
Your delegated SOL is safe. There is no indication of loss or risk to staked principal. Delegated SOL remains in each delegator’s own stake account and was not moved.
Reward impact: Because we cannot fund the voting accounts on the compromised validators, they will not earn rewards starting with epoch 1070.
Recommended action: The impacted validators must be replaced. A new validator is being prepared, and we will post its details here as soon as it is available. We are working directly with affected customers to move stakes to newly created validators quickly and minimise gaps in rewards.
If you need help deactivating, withdrawing or re-delegating, please contact Blockdaemon support - support@blockdaemon.com
Full details and live updates are published here: https://www.blockdaemon.com/incident-reports/operational-impact-on-solana-validators
Oct 28, 2026 - 10:46 UTC
Your delegated SOL is safe. There is no indication of loss or risk to staked principal. Delegated SOL remains in each delegator’s own stake account and was not moved.
Reward impact: Because we cannot fund the voting accounts on the compromised validators, they will not earn rewards starting with epoch 1070.
Recommended action: The impacted validators must be replaced. A new validator is being prepared, and we will post its details here as soon as it is available. We are working directly with affected customers to move stakes to newly created validators quickly and minimise gaps in rewards.
If you need help deactivating, withdrawing or re-delegating, please contact Blockdaemon support - support@blockdaemon.com
Full details and live updates are published here: https://www.blockdaemon.com/incident-reports/operational-impact-on-solana-validators
Oct 28, 2026 - 10:46 UTC
Identified - We have identified an issue affecting Solana, and our team is actively working on a resolution.
We will keep you informed and share updates as progress is made. We sincerely apologize for any inconvenience this may be causing and appreciate your patience as we work to resolve the matter.
If you have any questions or need further assistance, please don’t hesitate to contact your Account Manager!
Thank you for your understanding!
Oct 26, 2026 - 15:19 UTC
We will keep you informed and share updates as progress is made. We sincerely apologize for any inconvenience this may be causing and appreciate your patience as we work to resolve the matter.
If you have any questions or need further assistance, please don’t hesitate to contact your Account Manager!
Thank you for your understanding!
Oct 26, 2026 - 15:19 UTC
About This Site
We continuously monitor the status of the Blockdaemon.com and all related services. If there are any interruptions in our service, an incident will be raised here.
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Scheduled Maintenance
[Stellar] Upgrade to Stellar-RPC v30.0.0, Stellar-Core v30.0.0 and Stellar-Horizon v30.0.0 Nov 9, 2026 10:00-11:00 UTC
Blockdaemon will update Stellar Mainnet nodes to Stellar-RPC v30.0.0, Stellar-Core v30.0.0 and Stellar-Horizon v30.0.0 on 11/09/26. We are updating our nodes due to a release from the Stellar foundation. This update applies to all Blockdaemon Stellar Mainnet nodes, there will be planned downtime of up to 10 minutes per node.
We have tested the release and do not anticipate any unexpected downtime other than mentioned above as a result of the update. If you have any questions or concerns please reach out to your Account Manager.
If you want additional information please review the release notes here:
https://github.com/stellar/stellar-rpc/releases/tag/v30.0.0
https://github.com/stellar/stellar-horizon/releases/tag/v30.0.0
https://github.com/stellar/stellar-core/releases/tag/v30.0.0
Posted on Nov 03, 2026 - 12:00 UTC
We have tested the release and do not anticipate any unexpected downtime other than mentioned above as a result of the update. If you have any questions or concerns please reach out to your Account Manager.
If you want additional information please review the release notes here:
https://github.com/stellar/stellar-rpc/releases/tag/v30.0.0
https://github.com/stellar/stellar-horizon/releases/tag/v30.0.0
https://github.com/stellar/stellar-core/releases/tag/v30.0.0
Posted on Nov 03, 2026 - 12:00 UTC
[Canton] - Devnet Upgrade to Splice v0.10.0 Nov 9, 2026 14:00-15:00 UTC
Blockdaemon will update all Canton Devnet nodes to Splice v0.10.0 on 11/04/2026 at 14:00 UTC. We are updating our nodes due to a release from the Canton foundation. This update applies to all Canton Devnet nodes; there will be planned downtime of up to 15 minutes per node.
We have tested the release and do not anticipate any unexpected downtime other than mentioned above as a result of the update. If you have any questions or concerns, please reach out to your Account Manager.
If you want additional information, please review the release notes here:
https://docs.canton.network/global-synchronizer/release-notes/splice#0-10-0
Posted on Nov 05, 2026 - 16:17 UTC
We have tested the release and do not anticipate any unexpected downtime other than mentioned above as a result of the update. If you have any questions or concerns, please reach out to your Account Manager.
If you want additional information, please review the release notes here:
https://docs.canton.network/global-synchronizer/release-notes/splice#0-10-0
Posted on Nov 05, 2026 - 16:17 UTC
[Canton]- Internal Maintenance Nov 10, 2026 09:00-13:00 UTC
Blockdaemon will be carrying out essential maintenance to the following Canton Mainnet nodes on 11/10/2026 at 9:00 UTC. We have tested the release and do not anticipate any downtime as a result of the update. If you have any questions or concerns please reach out to your Account Manager.
Posted on Nov 05, 2026 - 10:26 UTC
Posted on Nov 05, 2026 - 10:26 UTC
[Canton] - MainNet upgrade to Splice v0.9.4 Nov 11, 2026 14:00-15:00 UTC
Blockdaemon will update Canton MainNet Validator nodes to Splice v0.9.4 on 11/11/2026 between 14:00 and 15:00 UTC. We are updating our nodes due to a release from the Canton foundation. This update applies to all Blockdaemon Canton MainNet Validator nodes, there will be planned downtime of up to 15 minutes per node.
We have tested the release and do not anticipate any unexpected downtime other than mentioned above as a result of the update. If you have any questions or concerns please reach out to your Account Manager.
If you want additional information please review the release notes here:
https://docs.canton.network/global-synchronizer/release-notes/splice#0-9-4
Posted on Nov 05, 2026 - 16:22 UTC
We have tested the release and do not anticipate any unexpected downtime other than mentioned above as a result of the update. If you have any questions or concerns please reach out to your Account Manager.
If you want additional information please review the release notes here:
https://docs.canton.network/global-synchronizer/release-notes/splice#0-9-4
Posted on Nov 05, 2026 - 16:22 UTC
[Canton] - TestNet upgrade to Splice v0.10.0 Nov 11, 2026 14:00-15:00 UTC
Blockdaemon will update Canton TestNet Validator nodes to Splice v0.10.0 on 11/11/2026 between 14:00 and 15:00 UTC. We are updating our nodes due to a release from the Canton foundation. This update applies to all Blockdaemon Canton TestNet Validator nodes, there will be planned downtime of up to 15 minutes per node.
We have tested the release and do not anticipate any unexpected downtime other than mentioned above as a result of the update. If you have any questions or concerns please reach out to your Account Manager.
If you want additional information please review the release notes here:
https://docs.canton.network/global-synchronizer/release-notes/splice#0-10-0
Posted on Nov 05, 2026 - 16:21 UTC
We have tested the release and do not anticipate any unexpected downtime other than mentioned above as a result of the update. If you have any questions or concerns please reach out to your Account Manager.
If you want additional information please review the release notes here:
https://docs.canton.network/global-synchronizer/release-notes/splice#0-10-0
Posted on Nov 05, 2026 - 16:21 UTC